When I read your post, it made me think about a long form Atlantic article that did a deep dive into the Trump campaign's primary and general election strategy which was a departure from previous campaigns. Essentially, if I understood it correctly they identified these "captains" who went out and found 10 additional people sympathetic to Trump, got them to register and thus managed to engage low-participation republicans. I haven't read any commentary on this strategy after the election but I do wonder whether the Republican party leveraged social capital that did exist in ways better than republicans. Honestly it had a MLM feel to it (which seems on brand for Trump).
Social capital cuts both ways, it is a source of power for authoritarian populists who create ties through entertainment and share grievance and it is also a means of building solidarity for social care.
Scouring precinct-level statistics from the four previous times Trump had competed in Iowa—the primary and general elections in 2016 and 2020—they isolated the most MAGA-friendly pockets of the state. Then, comparing data they’d collected from those areas against the state’s voter file, LaCivita and Wiles found what they were looking for: Some 8,000 of those Iowans they identified as pro-Trump—people who, over the previous seven or eight years, had engaged with Trump’s campaign either physically, digitally, or through the mail—were not even registered to vote. Thousands more who were registered to vote had never participated in a caucus. These were the people who, if converted from sympathizers to supporters, could power Trump’s organization.
Political consultants often consider eligible voters on a one-to-five scale: Ones being the people who never miss an election and hand out campaign literature in their spare time, fives being the reclusive types who can’t be canvassed, have never cast a vote, and probably never will. Most campaigns, especially in Iowa, focus their resources on the ones and twos. “There was this other bucket that we identified: low-propensity Trump supporters,” Wiles said. “We sort of took a gamble, but we were really sure that those tier-three people would be participating, that they would be our voters.”
Several times in the summer and fall of 2023, I heard from DeSantis allies who were bewildered by what Trump’s team was (and wasn’t) doing on the ground. “Our opponents were spending tens of millions of dollars paying for voter contacts for people to knock on doors,” LaCivita said. “And we were spending tens of thousands printing training brochures and pretty hats with golden embroidery on them.”
The gold-embroidered hats were reserved for “captains,” the volunteers responsible for organizing Trump supporters in their precincts. Notably, Wiles said, most of these captains came from the third tier of Iowa’s electorate—they were identified, recruited, and then trained in one of the hundreds of caucus-education sessions Trump’s team held around the state. At that point, the captains were given a list of 10 targets in their community who fit a similar profile, and told to turn them out for the caucuses. It was called the “10 for Trump” program. The best way to find and mobilize more low-propensity Trump supporters, the thinking went, was to deputize people just like them.
When I read your post, it made me think about a long form Atlantic article that did a deep dive into the Trump campaign's primary and general election strategy which was a departure from previous campaigns. Essentially, if I understood it correctly they identified these "captains" who went out and found 10 additional people sympathetic to Trump, got them to register and thus managed to engage low-participation republicans. I haven't read any commentary on this strategy after the election but I do wonder whether the Republican party leveraged social capital that did exist in ways better than republicans. Honestly it had a MLM feel to it (which seems on brand for Trump).
Social capital cuts both ways, it is a source of power for authoritarian populists who create ties through entertainment and share grievance and it is also a means of building solidarity for social care.
Here's the article (gifted it in case you don't have an Atlantic subscription): https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/07/trump-campain-election-2024-susie-wiles-chris-lacivita/678806/?gift=FPYxT57CtBr2t5wdWSZ0QMFF-11ZEeOJ3uFB6PX9p_o&utm_source=copy-link&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share
Here's the core description of the strategy:
Scouring precinct-level statistics from the four previous times Trump had competed in Iowa—the primary and general elections in 2016 and 2020—they isolated the most MAGA-friendly pockets of the state. Then, comparing data they’d collected from those areas against the state’s voter file, LaCivita and Wiles found what they were looking for: Some 8,000 of those Iowans they identified as pro-Trump—people who, over the previous seven or eight years, had engaged with Trump’s campaign either physically, digitally, or through the mail—were not even registered to vote. Thousands more who were registered to vote had never participated in a caucus. These were the people who, if converted from sympathizers to supporters, could power Trump’s organization.
Political consultants often consider eligible voters on a one-to-five scale: Ones being the people who never miss an election and hand out campaign literature in their spare time, fives being the reclusive types who can’t be canvassed, have never cast a vote, and probably never will. Most campaigns, especially in Iowa, focus their resources on the ones and twos. “There was this other bucket that we identified: low-propensity Trump supporters,” Wiles said. “We sort of took a gamble, but we were really sure that those tier-three people would be participating, that they would be our voters.”
Several times in the summer and fall of 2023, I heard from DeSantis allies who were bewildered by what Trump’s team was (and wasn’t) doing on the ground. “Our opponents were spending tens of millions of dollars paying for voter contacts for people to knock on doors,” LaCivita said. “And we were spending tens of thousands printing training brochures and pretty hats with golden embroidery on them.”
The gold-embroidered hats were reserved for “captains,” the volunteers responsible for organizing Trump supporters in their precincts. Notably, Wiles said, most of these captains came from the third tier of Iowa’s electorate—they were identified, recruited, and then trained in one of the hundreds of caucus-education sessions Trump’s team held around the state. At that point, the captains were given a list of 10 targets in their community who fit a similar profile, and told to turn them out for the caucuses. It was called the “10 for Trump” program. The best way to find and mobilize more low-propensity Trump supporters, the thinking went, was to deputize people just like them.
What do you think?